The Irish Supreme Court has found in favour of a man whose prior suspended sentence was reactivated after he pleaded guilty to a later charge of dangerous driving causing death.
In 2013, Mr Wansboro was given a three-year suspended sentence for a number of driving offences. Six months later he hit a tree when fleeing a Garda pursuit, causing the death of a backseat passenger. Mr Wansboro pleaded guilty to dangerous driving causing death and serious bodily harm. The question of sentence was adjourned under section 99 of the Criminal Justice Act 2006 due to the existing suspended sentence. In 2015, the suspension was ultimately lifted and it was held that Mr Wansboro serve his three-year sentence followed by a consecutive five-and-a-half-year sentence.
In 2016, sub-sections 99(9) and (10) of the Criminal Justice Act 2006 were found to be unconstitutional in the case of Moore v DPP. This was on the basis that the legislation could lead to unequal treatment by not providing for the possibility of the second conviction – or the trigger offence conviction – being set aside on appeal, in which case the suspended sentence should not have been reactivated.
Mr. Wansboro appealed the reactivation, however lost in the High Court on the basis that he had not challenged the constitutionality of sub-sections 99 (9) and (10) before sentencing, and Moore did not have blanket effect therefore he could not rely on the declaration of unconstitutionality. The Supreme Court granted leave for a leapfrog appeal due to the volume of similar cases raising the same point of law.
The Supreme Court majority agreed that Mr Wansboro was not debarred from relying on the finding of invalidity in Moore. Delivering the majority decision,Ms Justice Dunne stated that the process of under which Mr Wansboro’s suspended sentence was revoked had been found unconstitutional and the Court found no apparent reason why he could not rely on the finding of invalidity in Moore. Justice Dunne emphasised that A v Governor of Arbour Hill Prison made clear that “a finding that an act or part thereof is constitutionally invalid will not result in final decisions made in judicial proceedings being set aside by reason of the decision declaring the legislation concerned to be constitutionally invalid”.
The appeal was allowed, with Justice Dunne stating that it was a matter for the DPP to consider whether or not she wished to remit the issue of sentence back to the Circuit Court for further consideration.
Ms Justice Mary Finlay Geoghegan dissenting stated that Mr Wansboro was debarred on appeal due to an inconsistent approach with his conduct in proceedings. She stated that the fact he had lodged no appeal against his convictions meant that they had reached finality. She remarked that the facts did not give rise to apprehension of a real injustice having occurred.
The Supreme Court stressed that the extent to which someone may be prevented from relying on unconstitutionality will be taken on a case by case basis.
Click here for the leading judgment in Wansboro v DPP.
Click here for the dissenting judgement of Justice Finlay Geoghegan.