
Gerry Whyte, 18 September 2017

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Introduction

Page 2, insert in line 15:

In contrast, in the Irish case of *NN v Minister for Justice and Equality* [2016] IEHC 470, (29 July 2016). Humphreys J held that in light of ss.192 and 246(7)(f) of the Social Welfare (Consolidation) Act 2005, a person subject to a deportation order did not have any right to social provision, commenting, at para.43, that “[t]hose who fall outside [the limits of social provision] simply do not benefit. Their fate must therefore be left to private initiative or indeed to their own efforts…”

Ch.1 – The Legitimacy of Judicial Activism on behalf of the disadvantaged

[TOPIC] (a) Doctrine of separation of powers

Page 16, add to first paragraph:

In *PC v Minister for Social Protection* [2016] IEHC 315, (29 April 2016), Binchy J indicated, at para.85, that to accede to the plaintiff’s claim that his statutory right to the State (Contributory) Pension was a constitutionally protected property right would amount to determining an issue of distributive justice contrary to the decision in *O’Reilly*. He also stated, at para.97, that a prisoner’s right to personal autonomy is not a socio-economic right “to have the judicial branch ensure a minimum level of economic provision by the other branches of government”. (This point was not addressed in the subsequent Supreme Court decision in this case – [2017] IESC 315, (27 July 2017).)

Page 27, add to n.60

Note, however, that Clarke J recently said, in *Persona Digital Telephony v Minister for Public Enterprise* [2017] IESC 27:

> It has long been said that the courts must act to find a remedy in any case where there is a breach of constitutional rights. While the
choice, as a matter of policy, between a range of possible ways in which a potential breach of constitutional rights might be removed is fundamentally a matter for either the Oireachtas or the Executive, it may be that circumstances could arise where, after a definitive finding that there had been a breach of constitutional rights but no action having been taken by either the legislature or the government to alleviate the situation, the courts, as guardians of the Constitution, might have no option but to take measures which would not otherwise be justified."

*Quaere* whether this might presage some departure from the very deferential approach espoused by Murray and Hardiman JJ in *T.D.?*

Page 28, add to n.62

Note, however, that in *A v Minister for Justice and Equality* [2014] IEHC 532, (14 November 2014) HC, MacEochaidh J, having cited Murphy J’s quotation above, said, *obiter*, at para.12.6, “It seems to me that the high point of the jurisprudence in the area confirms that courts should not trespass on the role of the executive or the legislature when deciding how a particular problem might be addressed. How public money is used is a matter exclusively for the Oireachtas working in co-operation with the executive. Nonetheless, where State action results in a breach of human rights and where the only remedy is the expenditure of additional money, the Court, in my opinion, must be entitled to make an appropriate order, even if the consequence is that the State must spend money to meet the terms of the order.” MacEochaidh J differentiates here between a situation in which the executive or legislature has yet to decide how to address a problem (where the courts should not intervene) and a situation in which the State has taken some action that affects human rights adversely. In that latter situation, the judge envisages that a judicial order could be made requiring the State to spend public monies to remedy the situation. On a broadly related though, at the same time, different point, in *O’Donnell v South Dublin Co. Co.* [2015] IESC 28, (13 March 2015) SC, the Supreme Court (*per* MacMenamin J.) indicated that the Constitution could affect socio-economic rights protected by legislation when it stated, at para.65, that statutory powers vindicating constitutional rights or values could give rise to a statutory duty if there were no reasons why the powers could not be exercised. MacMenamin J. cited *O’Brien v Wicklow UDC, ex tempore*, High Court, 10 June 1994 in support of this proposition.

Page 40, insert at beginning of n.111:

Though in *Minister for Justice and Equality v O’Connor* [2015] IECA 227, (23 October 2015) CA, Irvine J expressed the view, *obiter*, at para.9 of her judgment that in exceptional cases, there might be grounds for striking down an Act of the Oireachtas because of the absence therefrom of a vital provision.
In _Minister for Justice and Equality v O’Connor_ [2015] IECA 227, (23 October 2015) CA, Hogan J was prepared to grant a declaration that the European Arrest Warrant Act 2003 was unconstitutional insofar as it failed to provide for a statutory right to legal aid for persons facing surrender under the Act. On this point, though, Hogan J was in a minority on the Court of Appeal. On appeal – [2017] IESC 21 - the Supreme Court, _per_ O’Donnell J, indicated, obiter, at para.14, that where a constitutional challenge was based on the absence of a provision from legislation, it was conceivable that “in such circumstances a court might stop short of invalidating the Act, and instead make a declaration that insofar as the legal regime did not make available some feature required by the Constitution, it could not be operated.”

On appeal, the Court of Appeal that an appeal did, in fact, lie against a decision of the Circuit Court in these circumstances – _McCabe v Ireland_ [2015] IECA 156 (22 July 2015).

Note that in _N.H.V. v Minister for Justice and Equality_ [2016] IECA 86, Hogan J queries, at para.56, the legitimacy of this reliance on Art.45 in identifying implied rights for the purpose of Art.40.3.1.

In _Lowry v Mr. Justice Moriarty_ [2016] IEHC 29, (27 January 2016) HC, Hedigan J stated, at para.7.4, that the rationality standard applied to challenges to a decision “made with special competence in an area of special knowledge”.

See also the comments of Hedigan J in _Lowry v Mr. Justice Moriarty_ [2016] IEHC 29, (27 January 2016) HC where, at para.7.4 of his decision, he indicates that where an administrative decision affects rights, the standard of judicial review shifts from rationality review to proportionality review. In _Kivlehan v Raidió Telefís Éireann_ [2016] IEHC 88, (15 February 2016) HC, Baker J held that given RTE’s obligation to protect freedom of expression in the context of the democratic process, its decisions should be subject to proportionality review.
Page 108, add to n.3:


Page 109 amend lines 9-13 to read:

In O’Donnell v. South Dublin Co. Co. [2011] 3 IR 417, Laffoy held that the failure of the State to provide appropriate caravan accommodation to Travellers with severe physical disabilities amounted to an infringement of Art.8 of the Convention giving rise to an entitlement to damages. However the decision of the Supreme Court in a more recent case, also called O’Donnell v South Dublin Co. Co., [2015] IESC 28, (13 March 2015) SC, now precludes the Irish judiciary from reaching a similar conclusion in any future case in the absence of a decision of the European Court of Human Rights on the point.

Page 109, add to n.12:

In Moore v Dun Laoghaire Rathdown Co. Co. [2016] IESC 70, the Supreme Court held that where a warrant of possession of a family home had been obtained despite non-compliance with O.47, r.15 of the District Court Rules, (and which non-compliance resulted in a fundamental denial of fair process) the execution of such warrant was inconsistent with Art.8.2 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

Page 109, replace text in n.13 with:

Part 2 of the 2014 Act was commenced by S.I. No.121 of 2015.

Page 110, insert at end of first paragraph:

in C.A. v Minister for Justice and Equality [2014] IEHC 532, (14 November 2014) HC, MacEochaidh J rejected the argument that the Direct Provision Scheme for asylum seekers and persons seeking subsidiary protection violated Art.3 of the Convention. This Scheme is a largely cashless scheme of support, through the provision of accommodation and meals, for persons seeking asylum or subsidiary protection. People covered by the Direct Provision Scheme cannot seek
employment and must comply with detailed rules in the accommodation centres in which they live. They cannot claim any mainstream social welfare payments (other than discretionary payments made pursuant to ss.201 or 202 of the Social Welfare (Consolidation) Act 2005) by virtue of the operation of the habitual residence requirement in relation to social assistance payments and by virtue of the fact that they cannot establish a social insurance record that would enable them to claim social insurance payments. He distinguished the decision of the European Court of Human Rights in M.S.S. v Belgium, Application No. 30696/09, 21 January 2011, which concerned the treatment of asylum seekers in Greece on the ground that the circumstances said by the applicants to constitute inhuman and degrading treatment were not “startling or alarming examples of physical or mental abuse.” (Para.7.2.1). Moreover in the instant case the applicants had also failed to establish the negative effects they claimed constituted inhuman and degrading treatment. For the same reason, the judge held that the applicants had failed to establish that the Direct Provision Scheme unlawfully interfered with their family life as protected by Art.8 of the Convention, though he did hold that certain rules applied by the accommodation centres under the Scheme did infringe privacy rights under the Convention and the Constitution. While this case was largely unsuccessful, it does raise the possibility that if State treatment of vulnerable groups is particularly severe, this may amount to a breach of Art.3 of the Convention. More recently, in Agha v Minister for Social Protection [2017] IEHC 6, White J held, inter alia, that the denial of child benefit to the applicants in respect of the period when they did not have a right to reside in Ireland did not infringe Art.8 of the Convention having regard to the margin of appreciation afforded to contracting States in respect of measures of economic or social strategy, the fact that the applicants were entitled to direct provision during this time and also the fact that there were no culpable delay in processing the applications for family reunification or Zambrano rights.

[TOPIC] 2. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union

Page 113, add to n.34:

In Minister for Justice and Equality v O’Connor [2014] IEHC 640, (4 December 2014) HC, Edwards J indicated that the requirement in Art.47 to provide effective access to justice did not necessarily mean that such access had to be by means of a statutory scheme of legal aid, a position endorsed by Ryan P on appeal in the subsequent decision of the Court of Appeal – [2015] IECA 227 (23 October 2015), at para.20 – though not addressed by the other members of the Court.

Page 114, add to n.36:

In AIB Ltd. v Aqua Fresh Fish Ltd. [2015] IEHC 184, (27 March 2015) HC, Keane J. held that the Charter was inapplicable to proceedings for
possession of lands in which the managing partner of a company sought to legally represent the company in court while in *N.H.V. v Minister for Justice and Equality* [2016] IECA 86 (14 March 2016) the Court of Appeal held, inter alia, that as Ireland had opted out of Council Directive 2013/33/EU (the Reception Directive), which addressed the right of asylum seekers to enter the labour market, a decision refusing the applicant the right to work was not implementing EU law with the result that the Charter was inapplicable.

On the inapplicability of the Charter in the context of deportation, see also *N.N. v Minister for Justice and Equality* [2016] IEHC 470. In *Bakara v Minister for Justice and Equality* [2016] IECA 292, the Court of Appeal held that the Charter did not apply to an application for residency rights while in *Morrissey v IRBC Ltd* [2017] IECA 162, the Court of Appeal held that the Charter did not apply to s.12 of the Irish Bank Resolution Corporation Act 2013. However the Charter might apply to actions for home repossessions given that mortgage contracts are subject to Council Directive 93/13/EEC – see *Aziz v Caixa d'Estalvis de Catalunya, Tarragona i Menresa*, Case C-415/11, 14 March 2013, and *AIB v Counihan* [2016] IEHC 752.

**Ch. 3 – The Implications of Public Interest Litigation for Civil Procedures and Remedies**

[TOPIC] Locus standi of private party acting in defence of the public interest

*Page 143, add to n.117:

In *Grace v An Bord Pleanála* [2017] IESC 10, (24 February 2017) SC, the Supreme Court (per Clarke and O'Malley JJ) stated, at para.6.7, “While it has been noted from time to time that a mere interest in ensuring that the law is upheld is not, in itself, sufficient to confer standing (for if it were then there would, in all cases, be the potential for a so-called *actio popularis* and standing rules might be of very little relevance save for excluding abuse of process and the like), nonetheless *Mulcreevy* seems to suggest that the nature of the measure under challenge may be such as to confer a right to challenge on a very wide range of persons (and possibly, in some cases, on all persons not motivated by bad faith or the like).”

[TOPIC] Taking account of the interests of those affected by litigation

*Page 159, add to n.193:

In *Attorney General v Damache* [2015] IEHC 339, (21 May 2015) HC, where submissions were heard during the proceedings at first instance from the Irish Human Rights and Equality Commission acting as an *amicus curiae*, the State complained that the Commission had
overstepped its role by commenting on the evidence. However, in Part 5 of the judgment, Donnelly J rejected criticism about the Commission’s commentary on facts that were either agreed between the parties or that might be so found. She also commented that it was necessary for all parties, including an amicus, when dealing with a contentious issue, to focus their points of law on the facts of the case and that it was unrealistic to suggest that submissions of law could take place in a factual vacuum. Finally, she indicated that objections to submissions made by an amicus should be made in open court during the course of the proceedings rather than, as here, by way of written submissions filed with the leave of the court towards the end of the hearing. In LC v Director of Oberstown [2016] IEHC 740, Eagar J refused to give the Commission permission to appear as an amicus curiae in the instant case, suggesting that such an intervention by the Commission would be more appropriate in relation to any appeal to the Court of Appeal.

Page 162, add to n.218:

This decision of Hogan J led Keane J to comment, in Data Protection Commissioner v Facebook Ireland Ltd. [2016] IEHC 414 (19 July 2016), at para.13, that “the reluctance of a court to admit a party as an amicus curiae if they have a strong view or vested interest seems to have diminished somewhat in recent times.”

Page 163, add to n.220

But note the views of Donnelly J in Attorney General v Damache [2015] IEHC 339, (21 May 2015) HC relation to the right of the Irish Human Rights and Equality Commission to comment on the facts of a case when acting as an amicus curiae. In Data Protection Commissioner v Facebook Ireland Ltd. [2016] IEHC 414 (19 July 2016) HC, Keane J was influenced by the fact that there was no factual dispute between the parties and also by the fact that parties wishing to be heard by the CJEU in the context of a reference to that court must have participated in the relevant proceedings before the national court in holding that certain parties could act as amici curiae at trial stage. In a follow-up ruling to this decision, Data Protection Commissioner v Facebook Ireland Ltd. [2017] IEHC 105, (20 February 2017), Costello J stated, at para.7 of her judgment, that there was no absolute rule that an amicus curiae can never give evidence but that, as a general rule, an amicus curiae is not permitted to give evidence. She also stated, at para.10, that an amicus curiae cannot contest the undisputed facts in a case.

[TOPIC] (a) Exercise of judicial discretion to award costs to unsuccessful litigant

Page 171, insert before last para:

In R.A. v Refugee Appeals Tribunal [2015] IEHC 830, (21 December 2015) HC, Humphreys J exercised his discretion to
depart from the rule that costs follow the event in a case that, *inter alia*, raised a point of law of exceptional public importance, where there was a need to resolve a conflict between two High Court decisions and where the issues raised were of great practical significance. See also his decision in *B.W. v Refugee Appeals Tribunal* [2015] IEHC 833, (21 December 2015) HC where he also departed from the general rule that costs follow the event because, *inter alia*, a resolution of the case would bring clarity and certainty for both the State and all applicants for asylum under the Refugee Act 1996 and the legal issues raised in the case could have been addressed more explicitly by the Oireachtas. In a third case, *K.R.A. v Minister for Justice and Equality (No.2)* [2016] IEHC 421, (24 June 2016), Humphrey J took account of, *inter alia*, the opacity of the legislation at issue in the case and the conduct of the respondent in attempting unilaterally to resile from representations made to the court at the hearing in departing from the general rule.

In *C.A. v Minister for Justice and Equality* [2015] IEHC 432, (10 June 2015) HC, MacEochaidh J refused to award costs against an unsuccessful litigant who had challenged the system of direct provision for asylum seekers and whose lawyers had acted on a *pro bono* basis, on the ground that to do so would cause significant injury to the interests of justice generally as it would mean her lawyers would not be paid for the work that they had done. He continued:

> If this were ordinary private litigation the court would have no reason to be concerned by the possibility of the applicant’s lawyers not being paid. However, the court acknowledges that the only manner in which a person in the circumstances of the applicant can exercise a right of access to court is if her lawyers are willing to act on a conditional fee basis. That a vulnerable group of people have been living in the challenging circumstances of direct provision for extremely lengthy periods of time, well beyond the six months for which the scheme was intended, is exclusively attributable to inefficiencies on the State side. The sorry saga of direct provision cannot be described as the State’s finest hour. A legal challenge of some sort was surely inevitable - as inevitable as the public campaign addressed to the Government. To award the respondent the costs of the issues which it won would have a chilling effect on litigation of this sort and might have the effect of denying vulnerable and marginalised people their constitutional right of access to the courts. Therefore, I refuse to make an order in favour of the respondents.

1 At para.26 of his judgment. However he also indicated, at para.29, that special
This approach, if adopted by other judges, may offer some protection to unsuccessful public interest litigants against the risk of having to pay the costs of their successful opponents. However whether a judge is willing to take this approach will only become clear after the conclusion of the litigation and so an unsuccessful plaintiff in _pro bono_ litigation remains at some risk that she will have to pay her opponent's costs.

_page 171, add to n.255:

Note, however, that the fact that the unsuccessful plaintiff in _P.C. v Minister for Social Protection_ [2016] IEHC 343, (14 June 2016) HC had a personal interest in his litigation did not prevent Binchy J awarding him two thirds of his costs where a number of other parties would have had an interest in the outcome of the litigation.

[**TOPIC**]  (b) _Protective costs order_

_page 176, add to n.274:

In _Callaghan v An Bord Pleanála_ [2015] IEHC 235, (20 February 2015) HC, McGovern J held that s.50B did not apply to a decision of the Board that a proposed development was a strategic infrastructure development.

[**TOPIC**]  Doctrine of mootness

_page 183, replace last 5 lines in n.302 with:

On appeal, this was one of the factors that led the Supreme Court to hear the appeal, though the matter was moot – see [2014] 2 ILMR 341 at pp.348-9. See also _Dundon v. Governor of Cloverhill Prison_ [2013] IEHC 608, (3 December 2013) HC, _Whelan v Governor of Mountjoy Prison_ [2015] IEHC 273, (1 May 2015) HC and _McDonagh v Governor of Mountjoy Prison_ [2015] IECA 71, (20 March 2015) CA for further applications of this principle.

care is required to ensure that _pro bono_ litigation is conducted efficiently and in a manner that does not unreasonably inflate expense for the defendant. In _B.A. v Minister for Justice and Equality_ [2015] IEHC 861, (16 November 2015) HC, MacEochaidh J, in an _ex tempore_ decision, refused to follow his own decision in _C.A._ on the ground that the instant case did not share sufficient qualities of public interest to warrant applying that approach. He noted, _inter alia_, that the plaintiff did not represent a class of persons making the same complaint.
See also the comments of Charleton J at paras.36-9 of his judgment in *Child and Family Agency v McG [2017] IESC 9.*

**Ch.4 – Practical issues relating to the use of litigation strategy**

[TOPIC] *(a) Doctrines of champerty and maintenance*

*Page 201-2*

Section 18(2) of the Legal Services Regulation Act 2015 authorises the Legal Services Regulatory Authority to make regulations in relation to the advertising of legal services but this section has not yet been commenced.

*Page 202 – Insert following footnote in line 10 after the word “offence”*

See s.3 of the Maintenance and Embracery Act 1634, retained by the Statute Law Revision Act 2007.

*Page 202, add to n.20:*

See the Law Reform Commission’s Issues Paper on Contempt of Court and other Offences and Torts involving the Administration of Justice (2016), pp.66-76.

*Page 202, add to n.23:*

In *SPV Osus Ltd v HBSC Institutional Trust Services (Ireland) Ltd. [2015] IEHC 602*, (5 October 2015) HC, where it was common case between the parties that the assignment of a bare cause of action was champertous, Costello J held that the assignment, for no legitimate reason recognized by Irish law, of the right to litigate third party claims was contrary to public policy, void and unenforceable. On appeal - [2017] IECA 56 - the Court of Appeal (*per* Ryan P) held that the assignment of a bare cause of action is void unless it can be excused as an exception recognized in law. Ryan P also stated that the category of excusing circumstances is not closed. For a case in which a third party had a legitimate interest in taking over litigation, see *Waldron v Herring [2013] IEHC 294*, (28 June 2013) HC.

*Page 204, add to n.33:*

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that in the absence of the no-win no-fee agreement and its compliance with s.68 of the Solicitors (Amendment) Act 1994, there was not sufficient evidence before the High Court to demonstrate the existence of an effective After the Event (ATE) insurance policy. In addition the policy here was so conditional
that it did not provide a sufficient security to the defendant to warrant refusal of an order for security for costs and so the appeal against the High Court decision was allowed. However the Court did not address the question of whether such policies might amount to either maintenance or champerty – see Greenclean Waste Management Ltd. v Leahy [2015] IECA 97, (8 May 2015) CA. This issue was directly addressed by Donnelly J in Persona Digital Telephony Ltd v Minister for Public Enterprise [2016] IEHC 187, (20 April 2016) HC wherein she held that professional third party funding of litigation in return for a share of the proceeds contravened the rules on maintenance and champerty and that she did not have the jurisdiction to develop the statutory offences of maintenance and champerty even where the constitutional right of access to the courts featured, albeit indirectly, in the case before her. (She did point out, however, at para.86, that the court had not been asked to examine the constitutionality of the offences and torts of maintenance and champerty.) However Persona would not appear to be applicable to lawyers who offer their services gratuitously or perhaps even on a “no foal, no fee” basis where they are motivated by the desire to ensure that an indigent litigant has access to justice.

Page 204, add to para.2 after n.36

In contrast, such judicial references as exist in Irish case law to the “no foal, no fee” system are, at worst, tolerant and, at best, approving, though none constitute binding authority for the legality of the practice. Thus in C.A. (Costs) v Minister for Justice2 MacEochaidh J, viewing a conditional fee arrangement as a means of enabling vulnerable and marginalized people to exercise their constitutional right of access to the courts, refused to award costs against an unsuccessful litigant whose lawyers had acted on a pro bono basis while in both McHugh v. Keane3 and Synnott v. Adekoya4 the Irish High Court entertained actions in which it was accepted, albeit sub silentio, that a ‘no foal, no fee’ arrangement was a valid contract.5 In Persona Digital Telephony v Minister for Public Enterprise6 Denham CJ commented, at para.54, that there was “a long history at the Bar, and amongst solicitors, of taking cases on a "no foal, no fee" basis” and in his judgment Clarke J referred, without disapproval, to this practice.

[TOpic] b) Liability for costs

Page 208, insert after line 9:

2 [2015] IEHC 432, (10 June 2015) HC.
3 High Court, 16 December 1994.
5 Though solicitors are generally prohibited from advertising their services on this basis - see art.9 of the Solicitors (Advertising) Regulations 2002 [S.I. No.518 of 2002]].
6 [2017] IESC 17.
In *He v Governor of Castlerea Prison* [2015] IEHC 854, (20 October 2015) HC, McDermott J held that a wasted costs order was appropriate in circumstances in which two solicitors failed to take the minimal steps to inform themselves of the facts of their clients’ cases. However he refrained from making such an order in light of the full apology made to the court by each of the solicitors and in light of the fact that the proceedings were discontinued at an early stage.

**Page 209, add to second para:**

In *C.A. (Costs) v Minister for Justice* [2015] IEHC 432, (10 June 2015) HC MacEochaidh J explicitly rejected the suggestion that a “no foal, no fee” arrangement disentitles a litigant from securing costs from his or her opponent because the litigant has no liability to his or her own lawyers, saying that such a view was not consonant with modern reality. He also refused to award costs against the unsuccessful plaintiff in this *pro bono* litigation on the ground that this would cause significant injury to the interests of justice as it would mean that her lawyers would not be paid for the work they had done and that to award costs against an unsuccessful plaintiff in such a case “would have a chilling effect on litigation of this sort and might have the effect of denying vulnerable and marginalized people their constitutional right of access to the courts.” (Para.26). Specifically in relation to independent law centres regulated by The Solicitors Acts, 1954 to 2002 (Independent Law Centres) Regulations 2006 [S.I. No.103 of 2006], it is worth noting that among the conditions that must be satisfied by an organization wishing to be treated as an independent law centre are that the organization must not “and does not intend to charge legal costs and outlays to a client over and above those legal costs and outlays that are recoverable by the client from another source” - reg.4(3)(c) – and that the organization “applies all legal costs and outlays recovered by an employed solicitor on behalf of a client solely for furthering the charitable purposes of the organization and in particular the provision to clients of legal services” – reg.4(3)(d). These provisions clearly imply that independent law centres may recover costs in *pro bono* cases.

**Ch.5 – Judicial Treatment of Social Welfare Issues**

**(a) Independence of appeals system**

**Page 216, add to note 14:**

However, Barrett J’s decision was overturned by the Court of Appeal which held that s.186C(3) of the 2005 Act required the deciding officer to “have regard” to the opinion of the medical assessor in such cases – *CSB v Minister for Social Protection* [2016] IECA 116, (20 April 2016) CA. This did not mean that the deciding officer was bound by the opinion of the medical assessor but she was required to inform herself in respect of the matter to which she was obliged by statute to have regard and to
give reasonable consideration as to whether this should inform her decision-making. Hogan J said, at para.30, that if the deciding officer regarded himself or herself as bound by the medical assessor's decision, this would be an unlawful fettering of discretion. He also said at para.32, that if the deciding officer discounted the medical assessment provided by an applicant and "simply unthinkingly endorsed the contrary views expressed by the medical assessor", the applicant could appeal the decision or seek a statutory review pursuant to s.301 of the 2005 Act. If the original decision was upheld, its reasonableness could ultimately be challenged by way of judicial review. In the instant case, there was no evidence that the deciding officer had adopted a “fixed policy” position as statistics alone did not prove the existence of such a position (though the outcome might be different if statistics showed that a deciding officer had always or almost always decided in favour of the Minister).

[TOPIC] (b) Appellant’s right to be heard

Page 217, add to note 20:

In National Museum of Ireland v Minister for Social Protection [2016] IEHC 135, (7 March 2016) HC, the failure of an Appeals Officer to give the applicant an opportunity to comment on an e-mail on which the Appeals Officer subsequently placed some reliance rendered the hearing and subsequent decision unsatisfactory.

Page 217, insert new section at the end of the page:

- and duty to give reasons

The duty on deciding officers (and appeals officers) to give reasons for a decision has been considered on three occasions, with conflicting outcomes. In A.M. v. Minister for Social Protection,7 Hanna J dismissed an application seeking to quash a refusal to grant the applicant Domiciliary Care Allowance in respect of the applicant’s son who suffered from autism. The ground for the refusal, reflecting the language of s.186C of the Social Welfare (Consolidation) Act 2005 as amended, was that the extra care and attention required by the child was not substantially in excess of that required by a child of the same age who did not have the particular disability in question. Hanna J held that, contrary to the applicant’s submissions, adequate reasons had been given by the deciding officer for his decision to refuse payment. The deciding officer’s decision reflected the language of the legislation setting out the criteria for qualifying for the payment and did not prejudice the applicant’s right to seek a revision of the decision or to appeal against it to an appeals officer. According to the judge, the Department did not have to give detailed reasons for its decision but

7 [2013] IEHC 524, (25 October 2013) HC.
was only obliged to notify claimants of the grounds for the decision so that the right of appeal was not impaired. Hanna J also accepted the Department’s contention that, as there was no conflict of medical evidence as between the applicant’s GP and the Department’s medical assessors, the deciding officer did not have to give a detailed explanation of his decision in this regard and neither was the Department obliged to have the applicant’s son medically examined. He also indicated that the applicant should have taken an appeal under the 2005 Act against the decision to refuse payment rather than seeking to have it quashed by way of judicial review.

A.M. was subsequently followed by Baker J in *M.D. v Minister for Social Protection* [2016] IEHC 70, (9 February 2016) HC, which also concerned an application for Domiciliary Care Allowance, in relation to the applicant’s duty to pursue a statutory appeal in preference to seeking judicial review where the appeal is capable of remedying the identified defect in the decision being challenged. However in relation to the duty to give reasons, she said that this duty was based on more than the proposition that the giving of reasons was necessary to enable an applicant to make an informed decision on whether to appeal, or seek judicial review of, the decision. Citing remarks of Kelly J in *Mulholland v. An Bord Pleanála* [2006] 1 IR 153, she indicated that the duty to give reasons is also necessary in order to enable an applicant to know whether the decision maker had directed its mind adequately to the issues before it, a point not addressed by Hanna J in *A.M.* In the instant case, she characterised the reports from the Departmental medical assessors as devoid of factual content or analysis and following almost exactly the statutory formula when expressing the view that the legislative test was not met. These reports did not provide the deciding officer with a factual basis on which the officer “could engage the full decision making process, and compare or weigh the factors supportive of each position.” (Para.54). Accordingly the applicant had made out an argument that the deciding officer had failed properly to consider all of the evidence furnished by her and therefore the officer had erred in law and was in breach of fair procedures.

In a third case, *National Museum of Ireland v Minister for Social Protection* [2016] IEHC 135, (7 March 2016) HC, Murphy J also took a more demanding approach than that of Hanna J to the duty to give reasons when she held that deciding and appeals officers must set out the facts upon which the decision is based. She went on to cite with approval the comments of Kelly J. in *Mulholland v. An Bord Pleanála* [2006] 1 IR 153, that a decision making body:

“…must give its reasons and considerations in a way which not only explains why it has taken a different course but must do so in

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8 In fact, the applicant subsequently pursued a successful appeal against the decision to refuse payment – see *Malone v. Minister for Social Protection* [2014] IECA 4, (12 October 2014) CA, at para.8.
a cogent way so that an interested party can assess in a meaningful fashion whether or not the respondent’s decision is reasonably capable of challenge”.

In the instant case, Murphy J said that the failure of the appeals officer to set out clearly the facts on which his decision was based meant that it appeared, on the face of his determination, that he had, to some extent, engaged in the cherry picking of evidence.

[TOPIC] (e) Procedures: Miscellaneous

Page 223 – insert after first paragraph:

While s.10 of the Social Welfare (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2015 allows a deciding officer to seek the opinion of a medical assessor in relation to a claimant’s entitlement to social welfare, this provision does not appear to apply to social welfare appeals, thereby leaving unaffected the ruling of the Supreme Court in Kiely on the more limited role of medical assessors in that context.

Page 225, insert before last paragraph:

Finally in this context, in M.D. v Minister for Social Protection [2016] IEHC 70, (9 February 2016) HC, the same judge held that, having regard to the terms of s.186G of the Social Welfare (Consolidation) Act 2005, an applicant for domiciliary care allowance could not insist on a medical examination of her child as a deciding officer had no statutory power to call for a medical assessment of a child in respect of whom an application for domiciliary care allowance had been made (as distinct from a child in respect of whom the allowance was already payable).

[TOPIC] (a) Cases improving access to welfare payments

Page 249, insert after line 23

(vii) Disqualification of prisoners for receipt of State Pension Contributory

The final case to be considered in this section is PC v Minister for Social Protection10 in which a successful challenge was made to s.249(1) of the 2005 Act which disqualifies persons imprisoned or detained in legal custody for receipt of, inter alia, the State Pension (Contributory). By virtue of arts.218-219 of the Social Welfare (Consolidated Claims, Payments and Control) Regulations 2007 [S.I. No.142 of 2007], this disqualification applied only to persons detained pursuant to a

9 The applicant did, however, success on other grounds in challenging the deciding officer’s decision to refuse to pay this allowance – see above, page 11.

conviction by a court of law. The Supreme Court, *per* MacMenamin J, held that this amounted to an additional penalty imposed on the plaintiff which, because it was not imposed by a court of law, constituted a breach of Arts.34 and 38 of the Constitution.

**[TOPIC]** *(b) Cases unsuccessful in court*

*Page 253, replace the second paragraph with the following:*

The Supreme Court decision in *Meagher v. Minister for Social Protection* [2015] IESC 4, (29 January 2015) SC, like Kingham, turned on whether the claimant had satisfied one element of the contribution conditions relating to the Old Age (Contributory) Pension (now called the State Contributory Pension). In this case, the plaintiff had to show that he had paid at least 260 social insurance contributions in order to be eligible for a half rate of the SCP. The background to the case was that on 6 April 1988, compulsory social insurance was extended to the self-employed. However those self-employed persons over the age of 56 and entering insurance for the first time on 6 April 1988 were ineligible to claim the SPC as a condition of eligibility was that a claimant had to have entered insurance before attaining the age of 56. In 1999, the law was amended for this group to enable them to claim a half-rate of SPC if they entered insurance before the age of 62 provided they paid 260 weekly social insurance contributions. The applicant was under 62 on 6 April 1988 and paid PRSI as a self-employed person from that date until 4 July 1992 and as an employed person from 1991 until 4 July 1992 when he reached pensionable age. A social welfare Appeals Officer held that in the applicant’s retirement tax year, 6 April 1992 to 5 April 1993, the applicant had made 13 self-employment contributions and 13 contributions as an employee in respect of the 13 contribution weeks from 6 April to 4 July, when the applicant reached pensionable age. Critically, however, this left him short of having paid 260 social insurance contributions since entry into insurance in April 1988. The claimant argued that for self-employed persons aged 61 before 6 April 1988 who were concurrently employed contributors, the effect of s.21(1)(d) of the Social Welfare (Consolidation) Act 2005 and art.23 of the Social Welfare (Consolidated Contributions and Insurability) Regulations 1996 [S.I. No.321 of 1996] was that they were deemed to have paid self-employed contributions for the number of weeks in the contribution year 6 April 1992 to 5 April 1993 in respect of which employment contributions were not paid. This section provided, in relevant part, and with emphasis added:

Subject to regulations under section 22, where a self-employment contribution has been paid by a self-employed contributor of not less than the amount that he or she is liable to pay under paragraph (a) or the amount specified in paragraph (b), whichever is appropriate, the self-employed contributor shall be regarded as having paid contributions for each contribution week in that contribution year
This would have enabled the applicant to claim that he had paid 52 contributions for the contribution year 1992/1993 and, therefore, that he had paid 260 contributions since entry into insurance in April 1998, thereby qualifying for the half-rate of SPC.

This argument was opposed by the Minister who contended, inter alia, that s.21(1)(d) could not apply to any person who ceased to be a self-employed contributor on reaching pensionable age which, in the applicant’s case, was 4 July 1992.

Categorising the case as a question of statutory interpretation, the Supreme Court, per McKechnie J, said, at para.34 that principles of justice or fairness do not enter the exercise. As both parties agreed that s.21(1)(d) had to be given a literal interpretation, that was the approach taken by the Supreme Court, though McKechnie J noted that this was without deciding that such an approach was necessarily correct.

Reading the provision in the context of other provisions of the Social Welfare Acts, the Supreme Court noted, at para.42, that once pensionable age was reached, a person ceased to be within the social insurance scheme and that any provision of the legislation that would have the effect of continuing beyond pensionable age the accrual of rights that otherwise can only occur before that date would have to be clear, precise and definite to that end. The Court indicated that s.21(1)(d) was designed as a conversion mechanism whereby the once off yearly payments made by self-employed contributors could be adapted to fit within a scheme of weekly insurance contributions and that it was not intended to confer substantive benefits. The Court also held that art.23 of the 1996 Regulations applied only to those persons who, at the date of its operation, remained under pensionable age with the result that it could not apply to the applicant after 4 July 1992 and therefore he could not rely on the formula contained therein for calculating the number of self-employed contributions payable in a contribution year by a person who was concurrently a self-employed and employed contributor.

Neither did Art.22 of the 1996 Regulations apply to the applicant as that provision dealt with self-employed contributors ceasing to be self-employed but who might at some future time become PRSI contributors, something that was not possible in the applicant’s case given that he had reached pensionable age.

The Supreme Court considered that this outcome was very unsatisfactory, inasmuch as any self-employed person entering insurance for the first time and attaining the age of 61 before 5 April 1988 could not qualify for the SCP even though they had to pay self-employed contributions and yet no understandable reason had been given by the Minister for this state of affairs. However the applicant’s contention would equally have involved some measure of anomaly or inconvenience in that it would mean giving a substantive meaning to s.21(1)(d) of the 2005 Act when this was not, in fact, intended by the Oireachtas. Balancing the competing interpretations of the law, McKechnie J said that the balance rested in upholding the submission
fo the Minister so as to keep intact the integrity of the underlying scheme. He added, at para.56, that he could not find a “legally valid justification for judicially compounding a statutory mishap by adopting the alternative interpretive version which, when the Act is considered as a whole, is not open.” McKechnie J concluded, however, by regretting that the Minister had not acted on a recommendation on this matter made by the Human Rights Commission.

Both *Kingham* and *Meagher* involved very specific, technical provisions and although in both cases the provisions gave rise to issues of unfairness, neither court could resolve these issues, arguably because of the very determinate nature of the statutory provisions.

*Page 254, insert after the Douglas case*

In *G v Department of Social Protection* [2015] IEHC 419, (7 July 2015) HC, O’Malley J held that a commissioning mother in a surrogacy situation could not rely on the Equal Status Acts to argue that the social welfare code discriminated unlawfully against her by not providing her with maternity benefit when such benefit is provided to birth and adoptive mothers. The judge reasoned that it was not open to her to make a finding of unlawfulness in relation to one corpus of legislation, the Social Welfare Acts, on the basis of the policy set out in another piece of legislation, the Equal Status Acts and that the contrary view would have the effect of elevating the Equal Status Acts to all-but constitutional level. An alternative argument leading to the same conclusion would be to say that s.14(a)(i) of the Equal Status Act 2000, which provides that the Equal Status Act does not prohibit the taking of any action required by or under, inter alia, any enactment, protects decisions on welfare entitlements made in accordance with the provisions of the statutory social welfare code. In the instant case, it could be argued that the Social Welfare Acts required the welfare authorities to pay maternity benefit to birth and adoptive mothers only and therefore to discriminate against a commissioning mother in a surrogacy situation. O’Malley J considered that s.14 was irrelevant to the Department’s contention that it would be ultra vires the Minister to provide for a non-statutory payment to the commissioning mother as the Social Welfare Acts do not prohibit the payment of non-statutory payments. It is respectfully submitted, however, that this aspect of s.14 requires the focus to be on what is required under a piece of legislation, not on what might be prohibited by such legislation. The current provisions of the Social Welfare Acts require the authorities to exclude commissioning mothers in surrogacy situations from the payment of statutory maternity benefit

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and therefore that would appear to be protected by s.14 against any challenge taken under the Equal Status Acts.

In *Agha v Minister for Social Protection* [2017] IEHC 6, the essential issue was whether asylum-seekers could claim child benefit in respect of the period prior to the granting to them of residency rights in Ireland. Entitlement to child benefit is conditional on, *inter alia*, the claimant having habitual residence in Ireland and in that context, s.246(8) of the Social Welfare (Consolidation) Act 2005 provides that a person who has applied for residency rights in this jurisdiction under various prescribed provisions or for a declaration that he is a refugee shall not be regarded as being habitually resident in the State for any period before a declaration of refugee status is given or permission to reside granted. The applicants’ claim was rejected by White J. In the course of his judgment, he held that child benefit was an entitlement of the parent or other qualified adult, not an entitlement of the child; that the rights of a refugee operate from the date of the grant of the declaration of refugee status and are not backdated to the date of arrival into the State; that where the right to reside is based on the applicant’s child having EU citizenship (*Zambrano* rights), this did not give rise to a right to have entitlement to child benefit backdated to the date of birth of that child and that the fact that asylum-seekers do not have a right of residence (and so cannot satisfy the habitual residence requirement) is not arbitrary or unfair. He also rejected the argument that the fact that one of the child applicants who had refugee status still had to wait until his parent was granted residency rights before child benefit could be paid in respect of that child amounted to unconstitutional invidious discrimination. The judge noted that the habitual residence condition applied to both Irish and non-Irish citizens and that the constitutional guarantee of equality did not require identical treatment of all persons without recognition of difference of circumstance. Moreover the child’s needs were being met through the direct provision scheme. A similar conclusion applied to the situation of a citizen child in respect of whom child benefit was only payable when her mother was granted refugee status. White J also held that Art.28 of EU Directive 2004/83 did not require backdating of social benefits in light of the UK decision in *Blakesley v. Secretary of State for Work and Pensions* [2015] EWCA Civ 141, [2015] 1 WLR 13150 and that there was no breach of Art.18 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights dealing with the right to asylum. Finally, he held that the denial of child benefit to the applicants in respect of the period when they did not have a right to reside in Ireland did not infringe Art.8 of the Convention having regard to the margin of appreciation afforded to contracting States in respect of measures of economic or social strategy, the fact that the applicants were entitled to direct provision during this time and also the fact that there were no culpable delay in processing the applications for family reunification or *Zambrano* rights.

*Page 262, fifth last line, add footnote:*

Page 262, insert before last paragraph

In *Tarola v Minister for Social Protection* [2016] IEHC 206, (18 March 2016) HC White J held that an applicant who had not worked for more than a year had not established a right of residence under Directive 2004/38/EC. However Cousins argues – see here https://works.bepress.com/mel_cousins/98/ - that this is based on a misreading of Art.7(3) of the Directive and that applicants who have worked for less than one year are still entitled to remain on for at least six months after losing employment. Moreover such persons may also be able to rely on Art.14(4)(b) of the Directive, which prohibits the expulsion of Union citizens for as long as they provide evidence that they continue to seek employment and have a genuine chance of being engaged, even after the expiry of the six months referred to in Art.7(3). 12

Finally on the habitual residence test, in *DN v Chief Appeals Officer*, 13 White J upheld the constitutionality of s.246(7)(b) and s.246(8)(c) of the 2005 Act which, respectively, deny certain welfare payments to persons seeking subsidiary protection pursuant to the European Communities (Eligibility for Protection) Regulations 2006 and prevent the backdating of such payments to persons granted subsidiary protection in respect of the period prior to the granting of such protection. He also held that they were not contrary to Directive 2004/83 or the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.

*Ch.6 – Litigation and Children’s Rights*

Page 304, add to n.102:

In *Child and Family Agency v Q* [2016] IEHC 335 (16 June 2016) HC, O’Hanlon J accepted, at para.99 of her judgment, the legal submissions of a guardian *ad litem* that the greater the level of deprivation of constitutional rights of a child in care, the more rigorous must be the

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12 On appeal, the Court of Appeal – [2017] IECA 208, 19 July 2017 - subsequently proposed to refer the following question to the CJEU: “Where a citizen of another EU member state arrives in the host state and works for a two week period for which he is genuinely remunerated and thereafter becomes involuntarily unemployed, does that citizen thereby retain the status of a worker for no less than a further six months for the purposes of Article 7(3)(c) and Article 7(1)(a) of Directive 2004/38/EC such as would entitle him to receive social security benefits on the same basis as if he were a resident citizen of the host State?”

13 [2017] IEHC 52, (16 February 2017) HC.
application of the relevant procedures put in place by the authorities. She also held that the protective detention of a child must be subject to the safeguards of fair procedures and regular intensive welfare review – para.115.

Page 305, insert after quotation:

More recently, in Child and Family Agency v Q [2016] IEHC 335 (16 June 2016) HC, O’Hanlon J noted, at para.130, that the High Court could not exercise its inherent jurisdiction to order the protective detention of a minor if the therapeutic purpose of the detention is undermined by a lack of resources. She also indicated that in any ex parte application seeking the exercise of this inherent jurisdiction, the Court would have to be provided with documentation detailing, inter alia, an education plan, a therapeutic plan and a psychiatric treatment/intervention plan for the child.

Ch.8 - Litigation and access to legal services

Page 410, insert footnote at end of first paragraph

In MM v The Relevant Circuit Court Judge [2016] IEHC 756, Baker J noted, at para.18, that there was no rule or authority to support the proposition that all litigation concerning rights arising from the constitutional protection of the family, of children or of the bond between mother and child had to be funded by the State. Note, however, that in Persona Digital Telephony v Minister for Public Enterprise [2017] IESC 27, Clarke J, at para.2.6 of his judgment, tentatively raised the possibility that “in modern circumstances, it may be necessary to consider whether the right of access to the Court needs to be looked at on a broader basis which may, at least in some cases, require consideration of whether that right is, in practice, effective even though there may be no formal barrier to its exercise.” Later in his judgment, at para.2.8.(e), he suggested that “it may well be the case that there has been a very material increase in the number and type of case where the undoubted right to run the case as a litigant in person might be argued not to present effective access to the Court in any meaningful sense.” The language used here echoes that of the ECtHR in Airey v Ireland (1979-80) 1 EHRR 524 when it ruled that Ireland was in breach of Art.6 of the European Convention on Human Rights because Mrs. Airey did not enjoy an effective right of access to the courts in relation to her matrimonial case. The judge also indicated, at para.2.8.(g) that the “no foal, no fee” system may increasingly prove to be less effective in providing access to justice in practice and on this point he concluded, at para.2.9, that “there is at least an arguable case that the constitutional right of access to the court may include an entitlement that that right be effective, not just as a matter of law and form, but also in practice.” In the earlier case of Conway v Ireland [2017] IESC 17, the Supreme Court,
per Clarke J, raised the possibility, at para.2.25, that the State might be obliged to provide legal aid in some cases taken falling within the scope of the Aarhus Convention 1998 and/or the Public Participation Directives (Directive 2011/92/EU), (though it cautioned that this did not necessarily give rise to directly effective rights – see para.2.29)

Page 411, add to n.48

More recently, in M.C. v Legal Aid Board [2017] IEHC 26, (17 January 2017), Noonan J expressed the view that a prosecution taken pursuant to s.5 of the Courts (No.2) Act 1986, arising out of failure to comply with a District Court order dealing with the right of access to a child, could not be regarded as a civil case in respect of which legal aid could be provided under the 1995 Act.

Page 424, insert after last paragraph

In Ward v Judge Reynolds [2015] IEHC 783, (11 December 2015) HC, O’Malley J inferred from the reasoning in Carmody that a Circuit Court judge had the jurisdiction to grant a legal aid certificate for counsel in the case of an appeal from the District Court where this was, in the judge’s view, essential in the interests of justice (though in the instant case, she held that the applicant had not sufficient standing to maintain his action).

Page 427, insert new section after section (c):

(d) Miscellaneous decisions

Finally, the superior courts have handed down a number of miscellaneous decisions on other aspects of the criminal legal aid scheme. In Horvath v District Judge Bryan Smyth [2015] IEHC 16, (16 January 2015) HC, Kearns P. held that where a defendant was charged with two different offences arising from two different sets of circumstances, a District Judge did not have the authority to extend a legal aid certificate granted in respect of the first offence to cover the second offence. Instead, two certificates would have to be granted, though the State could then ask the court, pursuant to regulations 7(4) of the Criminal Justice (Legal Aid) Regulations 1965, to deem that only one certificate was granted to the defendant. This decision enables a defending solicitor in such a situation to make the case to court that she should be paid for both cases whereas if the original certificate was simply extended to cover the second offence this would have the result, as Kearns P. put it, “that the solicitor on record remains unpaid for the additional work done in respect of the second case, which can be quite substantial, even in the context of a seemingly uncomplicated set of proceedings.”

In O’Brien v District Judge Coughlan [2015] IECA 245 (10 November 2015) CA, the Court of Appeal, per Ryan P, indicated, inter alia, that a
District Judge may rule on an application for criminal legal aid at the conclusion of the case while in *King v Coghlan* [2015] IEHC 300 (14 May 2015) HC Hanna J held, on the facts, that a District Judge had properly dealt with an application for legal aid on the basis of the evidence before him.

*Page 427, add to n.124:*

In *Minister for Justice and Equality v O’Connor* [2017] IESC 21, (30 March 2017), the Supreme Court held that the absence of a statutory scheme of legal aid for persons arrested under a European Arrest Warrant did not infringe Art.40.1 of the Constitution.

**Ch. 10 – Access to Legal Services**

**[TOPIC] 1. Introduction**

*Page 447, replace n.1 with:*


**[TOPIC] 2. Salient features of the Scheme of Civil Legal Aid and Advice**

*Page 510, add to n.247:*

On 22 January 2016, the government introduced a new extra-statutory scheme of financial advice and legal aid and advice for insolvent borrowers and for people with home mortgage arrears.

**[TOPIC] 4. Evaluation of State provision of civil legal aid**
In Conway v Ireland [2017] IESC 13, the Supreme Court, per Clarke J, questioned whether the statutory scheme of civil legal aid could meet Ireland’s possible obligations under EU law to provide legal aid in at least some environmental cases.

For an evaluation of the impact of the recession on the statutory scheme of civil legal aid and advice, see FLAC, Accessing Justice in Hard Times (February 2016). This report notes, inter alia, a growing demand since the start of the recession for FLAC’s services in relation to housing, debt, employment and social welfare issues, areas of the law that generally fall outside the scope of the State scheme. It also points out that though there was an increase of more than 70% in the demand for the services of the Legal Aid Board between 2006 and 2012, the Board’s funding was reduced between 2008 and 2011 and as of 2013 was still below 2008 levels. It is also critical of the low level of allowable deductions in respect of accommodation costs and spousal maintenance used in calculating an applicant’s disposable income for the purpose of the statutory scheme’s means test and concludes that the Board’s triage system for dealing with waiting lists cannot be implemented effectively because of a lack of resources.