UK Supreme Court clarifies and broadens ‘vulnerability criteria’ for homeless housing applicants

A recent ruling of the Supreme Court in the United Kingdom will prove to be perhaps the most significant decision on the lives of single homeless people and their applications for social housing through their local council. The appeals of Hotak (Appellant) v London Borough of Southwark (Respondent), Kanu (Appellant) v London Borough of Southwark (Respondent) and Johnson (Appellant) v Solihull Metropolitan Borough Council (Respondent)[2015] UKSC 30 were heard last December 2014 with the judgement delivered on 13 May 2015.

The three cases concern applicants who were about to be made homeless, or who are currently experiencing homelessness. The three appellants made applications to local councils for accommodation under Part VII of the Housing Act 1996 Section 189 (1)(c). All three appellants’ applications were deemed unsuccessful. Section 189 (1)(c) concerns the allocation of accommodation for homeless people on a ‘priority need’ basis as a priority group which are deemed as Vulnerable. The case of Mr Kanu also concerned the Public Sector Equality Duty in the Equality Act of 2010 and whether this has an effect in the determination of priority need by a disabled (or other ‘protected characteristic’) applicant.

All of the cases raised a test of vulnerability against an objective comparator; the “ordinary homeless person who was able to cope”, objective laid down in R v Camden LBC ex p Pereira [1998] 30 HLR 317. Regarding this Lord Neuberger stated the test as to whether an applicant is vulnerable must involve all of his characterises and problems together. He also deemed that the Court of Appeal's decision that the council must ‘take into account its own burden of homeless person and finite resources” is wrong as the finite resource of accommodation of the Council ‘cannot in any way affect whether an applicant is in priority need’.

Lord Neuberger also denounced the use of terms such as ‘street homelessness’ as a comparator and the test of whether one could ‘fend for themselves’ which he said may be possible, but that doesn’t outline the applicant’s vulnerability. Neuberger did not, however go as far as to accept that no comparator is needed meaning the Court of Appeal’s vulnerability being “significantly more vulnerable than “ordinarily vulnerable” is correct but the judgment and discretion by individual Council housing officer’s assessment is too inconsistent. He stated that the correct comparator is “with an ordinary person, if made homeless, not with an actual homeless person”.

With regard to the specific issue of third parties in Hotak the applicants were unsuccessful in arguing that any support could be ignored in providing further assistance when homeless. However Lady Hale dissented on this issue stating that Mr Hotak’s brother would have actually been better off by not supporting him through their joint homelessness she stated that “both the vulnerable and non-vulnerable qualify as being priority need. The non-vulnerable can apply to them both”.

The judgement is available here.

Other legal opinions regarding this decision are available here.

A press release from a UK Housing Rights charity is available here.

 

 

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