The High Court has refused permission for judicial review proceedings challenging a government consultation on reforms to Agricultural Property Relief (APR) and Business Property Relief (BPR), holding that the claim was unarguable, out of time and barred by parliamentary privilege.
In R (on the application of Martin) v Chancellor of the Exchequer [2026] EWHC 1123 (Admin), a divisional court comprising Whipple LJ and Fordham J considered a challenge brought by two farmers and an agricultural association concerning a technical consultation conducted by HM Revenue and Customs.
The consultation related to proposed reforms to APR and BPR which were subsequently incorporated into the Finance Act 2026. At the time of the hearing, the measures were contained in the Finance (No 2) Bill 2025–26 awaiting Royal Assent.
The claimants argued that the government had promised meaningful consultation on the proposed tax changes but failed adequately to do so, giving rise to a legitimate expectation that had been unlawfully frustrated. The Chancellor of the Exchequer and HMRC denied that any such legitimate expectation arose and further argued that the claim was non-justiciable because it intruded into parliamentary proceedings protected by parliamentary privilege.
The Office of the Speaker of the House of Commons intervened to advance submissions concerning parliamentary privilege under Article IX of the Bill of Rights 1689, which provides that parliamentary proceedings ought not to be “impeached or questioned” in any court.
The court reviewed the authorities on parliamentary privilege, including R v Chaytor, which examined the scope of “proceedings in Parliament” and the constitutional rationale underpinning parliamentary immunity from judicial interference.
The claimants contended that the impugned consultation process could not itself constitute a proceeding in Parliament and argued that earlier authorities extending privilege to government decisions connected to forthcoming legislation had been wrongly decided.
The Speaker’s office submitted that the challenge would interfere with parliamentary business in two respects: first, because successful litigation could delay or obstruct the legislative process, and secondly because a judicial declaration that the consultation was unlawful would cast a “legal shadow” over the Finance Bill itself while it remained before Parliament.
The court accepted those submissions. Whipple LJ concluded that the Finance Bill plainly constituted a proceeding in Parliament and that adjudicating upon the lawfulness of the consultation which informed the legislation would necessarily “impeach or question” parliamentary proceedings contrary to Article IX.
The court also rejected the substantive basis of the claim, holding that there was no arguable legitimate expectation of consultation in the form alleged by the claimants. In addition, the proceedings were found to have been brought out of time.
Although the defendants also argued that the claim was non-justiciable because it concerned matters of high political judgment relating to tax policy, the court declined to determine that issue definitively. Whipple LJ nevertheless observed that it remained an open question whether challenges concerning consultation on tax policy changes may fall into the category of “quintessentially political” matters unsuitable for judicial determination.
The decision is likely to be regarded as a significant reaffirmation of constitutional principles concerning the separation of powers and the limits of judicial intervention in legislative processes.