The High Court has dismissed an appeal on a point of law concerning the application of the statutory “slip rule” to an alleged failure by a landlord to sign a notice of termination under the Residential Tenancies Act 2004.
Delivering judgment, Ms Justice Cahill described the appeal as entirely artificial and unmeritorious. She held that if the requirements of s.62 of the 2004 Act could not fall within the curative scope of s.64A, it was unclear what types of omission the latter provision was intended to address.
The appellant had occupied an apartment in Waterford since July 2019. Following rent arrears and related disputes, the landlord served a termination notice in November 2023. The tenant challenged its validity before the Residential Tenancies Board. An adjudicator determined that an earlier July 2023 notice was invalid but upheld the November 2023 notice and directed that the property be vacated. Damages of €3,000 were awarded to the tenant for breaches of landlord obligations, and rent arrears of €8,761.75 were found due.
On appeal, a Tenancy Tribunal upheld the validity of the November 2023 notice, concluding that the omission of the landlord’s signature constituted a “slip” within the meaning of s.64A and did not invalidate the notice. An unusual feature of the case was that the notice had in fact been signed, but the page containing the signature had not been before the Tribunal.
The tenant appealed to the High Court, arguing that the Tribunal erred in law in treating the apparent absence of a signature as a forgivable omission and that it lacked jurisdiction to do so. Additional grounds included alleged inadequacy of reasons, prejudice, and questions as to the authenticity of the signature.
Applying the principles in Deely v. The Information Commissioner, the Court emphasised that its role on a point of law was confined to assessing whether there was evidence capable of supporting the Tribunal’s findings and whether its conclusions were ones no reasonable tribunal could have reached. The Court noted the significant artificiality of an appeal premised on an omission that, on the true facts, had not occurred.
In addressing the scope of s.64A, the Court rejected the argument that so called “core” requirements under s.62 could not be cured by the slip provision. Relying in part on Heather Hill Management Company CLG & McGoldrick v An Bord Pleanála, Ms Justice Cahill found no basis in the statutory text for importing additional limitations into s.64A.
The Court observed that although the wording of s.64A refers to prejudice to the notice rather than to a person, its purpose is to ensure that minor slips or omissions which do not materially undermine the effectiveness of a notice do not render it invalid. Even if tenant prejudice were the relevant test, there was no basis for disturbing the Tribunal’s finding that none arose, particularly given that the tenant had at all material times been in possession of a signed notice.
The Court further rejected the complaint regarding inadequacy of reasons, noting the artificiality of criticising reasoning on a point that did not in reality arise. Allegations concerning agency and the authenticity of the signature had not been pursued before the Tribunal and were not material to the legal issue on appeal.
The High Court accordingly refused the reliefs sought and upheld the Tribunal’s determination.